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7.1  Introduction 
Viewed as an industry, state and local governments constitute one 
of  the largest sectors of the U.S. economy.  In 1985, state and local 
governments accounted for 8 percent of GNP and  13 percent of total 
employment, according to data from the  U.S. National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA). Only two two-digit SIC industries, real es- 
tate and retail trade, contributed more to GNP, and only retail trade 
accounted for more employment. 
State and local government is, however, not generally regarded as 
an industrial sector of the economy. Whereas analysis of industry data 
proceeds  within the framework of  production theory, analysis of  the 
state and local sector is typically based on the theory of demand. The 
theoretical literature stresses problems of demand revelation for public 
goods (e.g., the literature inspired by Tiebout), and the empirical lit- 
erature is oriented toward explaining the demand for public expendi- 
tures with a heavy emphasis on the median voter model. 
This difference in perspective is doubtless the result of institutional 
differences between the public and private sectors. Private goods are 
exchanged in  voluntary transactions between consumers and produc- 
ers, and it is natural to separate supply and demand decisions. Public 
sector goods, on the other hand, are generally distributed directly to 
consumers and paid for indirectly through taxation. Since supply de- 
cisions are made by governments controlled by consumer-voters, it is 
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easy to ignore the distinction between production and consumption and 
to focus only on the demand for public sector goods. 
This demand-side  focus obscures some important  supply-side as- 
pects of the state and local sector. In particular, the demand-side ap- 
proach fails to account for the income flows originating in the sector, 
and this failure has a number  of  important implications.  First, con- 
ventional measures of income originating in the general component of 
the  state and  local  sector only  include  wages  and  salaries. Capital 
income is implicitly assumed to be zero, despite the fact that (as we 
show below) this sector is one of the most capital intensive in the U.S. 
economy. Consequently, NIPA dramatically  understates  the relative 
size of the sector. 
Second, the failure to account for capital income obscures the true 
nature of federal government subsidies. In the recent debate over fed- 
eral tax reform, termination of the tax-exempt status of municipal bond 
interest and the elimination of the deduction for state and local taxes 
were two options considered. It was not generally recognized that the 
subsidy to the sector arises from the nonrecognition of  the “equity” 
income accruing to state and local capital. State and local capital is 
treated like owner-occupied housing under the federal tax code; the 
noninterest portion of income accruing to capital is excluded from the 
tax base. 
Third, the demand-side approach to the state and local sector cannot 
readily deal with the distinction between general subsidies, such as the 
deductibility of state and local taxes and general revenue sharing, and 
subsidies for capital formation,  such as the exemption of  municipal 
bond interest and matching capital grant programs. This distinction is 
important, because capital subsidies encourage the use of capital through 
output and factor substitution effects while general subsidies only in- 
volve output effects. The inability to distinguish between the two types 
of subsidies is analogous to the inability to distinguish between excise 
taxes and an investment tax credit in the private sector. 
Fortunately, there is no inherent reason to exclude supply-side con- 
siderations from the analysis of  the state and local sector. As shown 
in Hulten (1984), the production of public sector goods is analogous to 
the production of household goods (including owner-occupied housing); 
capital, labor, and intermediate inputs are purchased and transformed 
into output, which is distributed directly within the household. There 
is no explicit measure of output  in either case, but  in both  cases a 
shadow value of output is implicit in the maximization of utility subject 
to the relevant expenditure constraint. 
This shadow valuation of  output gives rise to an implicit system of 
income and product accounts for the state and local sector. The purpose 
of this paper is to develop this accounting framework. The remainder 
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a theoretical model of a simple economy in order to clarify the role of 
capital income in the state and local sector. Section 7.3  implements the 
accounting  framework  developed in  7.2.  We  present aggregate esti- 
mates of the gross output of state and local governments for the 1959- 
85 period  and then compare them to the estimates in NIPA. Section 
7.4 offers a brief summary and conclusions. 
7.2  Theoretical Considerations 
Nearly all local public goods and services are provided directly to 
consumers without charge and then financed indirectly through taxes. 
Since these goods are not bought and sold in markets, no direct measure 
of the value of the goods and services produced in this sector is avail- 
able.  It is therefore impossible to develop independent measures of 
both sides of the conventional accounting equation which relates the 
value of output to the value of inputs. 
This observation does not, however, imply that it is impossible to 
construct an appropriate income and product account for the state and 
local sector. In this section of the paper we show that such a system 
of accounts is implicit in  standard optimization  models of state and 
local governments.  In order to make our argument clear, we first de- 
velop a very general model of a simple economy. We then add important 
institutional details to our model which allow us to focus on the pro- 
vision of local public goods. 
7.2.1  A Static One-Sector Model 
We begin with a one-good model in which output Q is produced with 
capital K  and labor L via a production function Q  = F (K,L).  Under 
constant returns to scale, Euler’s equation yields  Q  = FKK  + FLL, 
where F, and FL  are the marginal products of capital and labor. This 
expression implies a rudimentary  accounting framework which  allo- 
cates the value of output to the inputs since FK  and FL can be interpreted 
as the shadow prices of capital and labor. 
Profit maximization adds additional structure to this simple account- 
ing framework. If product and factor markets are perfectly competitive, 
then the necessary conditions for profit maximization require firms to 
hire each input up to the point that the value of the marginal product 
of that input equals its factor price. Thus FK  = PK/PQ  and FL  = PL/ 
PQ,  where PK,  PL,  and PQ  are the prices of capital, labor, and output. 
Euler’s equation then implies that 
(1)  PQQ = PKK -k  PLL 
for each firm. Aggregating over firms yields the fundamental equation 
of income and product  accounting.  It states that the value of output 
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capital services (dividends, interest, rents, retained earnings, etc.) and 
the wage  bill.  This equation therefore generates a  simple T-account 
and corresponds to Section A, Table  1, of the U.S. National Income 
and Product Accounts. 
Households play two roles in such a model. First, they supply capital 
and labor to firms. Second, these households purchase a quantity of 
Q which satisfies the constraint that their expenditures equal the sum 
of their capital and labor income. The aggregation of this budget con- 
straint requires that PQQ  equals the sum of PKK  and PLL  and therefore 
generates a  set of  personal  income  and  outlay  accounts which  are 
analagous to Table 2 of Section A of NIPA. Factor and goods prices 
are determined through the interaction of supply and demand. We can 
characterize this economy with a familiar “circular flow” diagram shown 
in figure 7.1. 
This simple accounting model could be generated without  the as- 
sumption of optimizing behavior by  tracking commodity and money 
flows between agents in the economy. It is important to  stress,  however, 
that such a set of accounts also arises from optimizing models where 
markets are not  present. In  an optimally planned  economy without 
money or markets, the clockwise flow of commodities would be gen- 
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erated by the planners, but an implicit counterclockwise flow of values 
exists via shadow prices implied by optimization. We  draw on this result 
when we turn to the accounting for public goods for which there are 
no explicit markets. 
7.2.2  Intertemporal Aspects of  the Simple Model 
The model presented in the preceding section is essentially static in 
that the capital stock is fixed and the technology is constant. We  can 
introduce dynamic aspects into the model by  allowing consumers to 
make intertemporal decisions, either because they live for more than 
one period or because they wish to leave a bequest to their heirs. 
In such a model, consumers can trade consumption  in one period 
for consumption in another by setting aside some of one period's output 
to increase the stock of capital. Society faces two constraints.  First, 
the aggregate production function constraint in this model requires that 
Q, + I, = F(K,,L,,t),  where Q, is consumption at time t and I, is the 
amount of  the homogeneous good set aside for investment. Second, 
society is constrained by  the identity that the stock of  capital at the 
end of year t  +  1 is equal to the existing stock after depreciation plus 
any investment made during the year. We  assume that capital depre- 
ciates at a constant rate 6, and therefore the perpetual inventory equa- 
tion can be writtenl 
(2)  K,,, = I, + (I - 6)K,. 
The dynamic  version  of  our simple model  requires us  to draw a 
distinction between the asset price of capital and the user cost of capital. 
A consumer who purchases a unit of capital for his portfolio pays the 
asset price P!, which in our one good model must equal the price of 
the consumption good P?. The replacement value of the capital stock 
held by the household sector, which owns all factors of production, is 
therefore PYK,. 
The price of capital from the standpoint of the producer is the cost 
of using (or, renting) one unit of the consumers' capital for one period. 
It is this price, P,", which is equated to the value of the marginal product 
of capital under profit maximization. P;" is also the amount which is 
received by households (in the form of dividends, interest, rents, etc.). 
Therefore, the value of  owning one unit of  capital  W,  is the present 
value  of the  P;K  generated  over the  life of  the  asset.  Since capital 
depreciates at the rate 6, this must be given by2 
(3) 
The discount rate r in equation (3) is derived from the intertemporal 
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sumption in successive years. That is, the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption in year t and year t  +  1  is  1/(1  + Y). For sim- 
plicity, we assume that Y is constant. 
The capital  values Pf!  and  W, are not  necessarily  equal. Tobin’s 
marginal “q”  ratio is, indeed, defined as the ratio of the two values: 
(4)  w, 
q‘  =Pg 
However, the optimal investment program implied by the optimization 
of the intertemporal utility function has the property that, in the ab- 
sence of adjustment costs in changing the stock of capital, q, = 1. That 
is, the value of  the income generated by the stock of capital is equal 
to the reproduction  cost of  the stock. 
If  the economy is in  equilibrium and therefore prices are constant, 
equation (3) yields the well known Hall and Jorgenson (1967) expression 
for the user cost of capital.3 
(5)  PK  = PQ(r + 6). 
As we argue in  subsequent sections of  this paper, the public  sector 
analogue to (5)  is extremely useful in attributing capital income in the 
state and local sectors, since communities  typically  own the capital 
they use and annual payments to capital are not observed. 
A balance sheet for our simple economy is embedded in the frame- 
work underlying equation (4). The asset side of the ledger contains the 
reproduction  value of the capital stock, PPK,; this is the amount that 
could be obtained if  the physical  capital were sold. The liability  side 
of  the ledger  contains claims on the income flow generated by  the 
capital,  W,;  this is the amount that could be obtained if  the rights to 
the income were sold. This distinction  is somewhat artificial in  our 
simple model, but takes on significance when we allow consumers to 
transfer physical capital to firms in exchange for financial claims against 
the capital (e.g., stocks and bonds). 
Intertemporal considerations also influence the structure of the in- 
come and product accounts. The flow of capital payments from firms 
to households must now include a depreciation component. Net na- 
tional income in this economy will then equal gross income, measured 
either as the sum of factor payments or as the value of output, less 
depreciation. An investment and saving account must be constructed 
to balance the production of investment goods with consumer saving. 
7.2.3  A Three-Consumer-Good  Model with a Public Sector 
The jump from a one-sector accounting model to an N-sector model 
is, in  principle,  straightforward.  Each sector is characterized by  its 
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veloped along the lines set out above. The separate sectoral flows can 
then be aggregated to form an economy-wide set of accounts. The main 
complication arises when some sectors use the output of other sectors. 
In this case, intermediate inputs must be netted out in the aggregation 
across sector~.~  We  ignore this complication in this discussion. 
With this in  mind, we turn to the problem of accounting for public 
sector output. For reasons which will become apparent below, we begin 
with a simple model in which three goods are produced; a private sector 
good Z,  housing H,  and a local public good X.  As above, Z and H are 
produced by profit-maximizing firms operating in perfectly competitive 
markets. 
Initially we assume that communities rent capital and that they charge 
a user fee equal to marginal  cost, Px.  If  a  community is  to attract 
households it must produce local public goods at minimum cost. The 
necessary conditions for cost minimization  imply that marginal  cost 
equals the price of each input divided by that factor’s marginal product, 
and  therefore Px  equals PK/FK  and PL/FL.  Under constant returns, 
marginal cost is independent  of the scale of output and the value of 
the output equals the value of the inputs used to produce that output: 
(6)  PxX  = PKKX  i-  P“Lx. 
It is therefore clear that the fact that one of the goods is produced by 
state and local governments does not in any fundamental way change 
the set of accounts we would construct to characterize this economy. 
Suppose, now, that instead of renting capital, the community buys 
the stock of capital it needs for the production of local public goods. 
By analogy to the private sector, the change in the form of ownership 
will have no impact on the nature of our accounting framework. Private 
firms typically own the capital they use. The implicit income from this 
capital equals the explicit rent that would be charged in competitive 
markets; in a simple world without taxes, the appropriate per unit rental 
would be the Hall and Jorgenson user cost in equation (5). 
This may seem a trivial observation, but it contains a fundamental 
insight that is lost in most analyses of the public sector; the allocation 
of capital to the public sector production  implies a return to capital. 
This return is  equal  to PKKX,  and  reflects  the fact that consumers 
allocate their capital so that at the margin the net return from all uses 
is equal, i.e., the income from allocating capital in one use equals the 
opportunity cost of using capital in other uses. 
This is a rather unconventional  view of the public sector, in that it 
suggests that income should be attributed to the residents of a com- 
munity because they “own” streets, schools, etc. Clearly, communities 
never send their citizens a check which represents a payment for the 
use of capital; how, then, can it be claimed that capital “income” from 
schools and streets should be attributed to the local citizenry? 222  Charles R. Hulten and Robert M. Schwab 
In order to address this issue, it is helpful to again consider  the private 
sector for the moment. A share of stock represents a claim to a portion 
of the future income of a corporation and, equivalently, a claim to a 
portion of the corporation’s  physical stock of capital. These shares can 
be bought and sold and their value is determined in a stock market. 
Is there a public sector analogue to the stock market? When a con- 
sumer purchases a home in a community, that consumer simultaneously 
purchases a share in  a  corporation which  produces goods, i.e.,  the 
consumer purchases a share of the community’s capital stock. These 
shares may be bought and sold, though the market does not function 
quite like a stock market since the shares in these public corporations 
can only be transferred when a home is transferred. These public cor- 
porations also differ from private corporations in that the goods they 
produce are only consumed by  the owners of the enterprise. These 
differences aside, the value of a house must equal the value of housing 
capital and the value of a share, i.e., the value of a community’s public 
capital stock (net of outstanding debt) is capitalized into the value of 
homes in that community. 
This capitalization argument allows us to characterize the user cost 
for a community which owns the stock of public capital. Suppose a 
community purchases a unit of capital at the beginning of a year with 
P‘  tax dollars. The community uses the increment to its capital stock 
to produce local public goods and, in the process, the unit of capital 
depreciates to (1 - 6); housing values are thus higher by (1 - 6)P’ at 
the end of the year as a result of the unit investment. The community 
incurs an opportunity cost of rP‘  since the P* dollars required to pur- 
chase the capital could have been invested at the rate r. Therefore the 
cost of using this unit of capital for one year is P‘  + rP‘ -  (1 - 6) P‘, 
or  (r + 6)  PI.  But  clearly  this  is equivalent to the user  cost PK  in 
equation (5);  given capitalization, the cost of capital facing communities 
who own capital is the same as the imputed user cost. PK  can then be 
interpreted as  the additional end-of-year rent that the community would 
charge for the rental of  its housing, in view of the additional public 
capital owned by the community. 
Now  consider the form of  this payment. We  could  think  of  local 
governments setting a tax on its citizens as consumers equal to the 
cost of producing local public goods PKK + PLL  and then using a part 
of those tax proceeds to pay a “dividend” to its citizens as shareholders 
equal to PKK.  Of course, communities do not do this; they simply net 
out the dividend and set a tax of PLL.  Therefore the returns on public 
capital  take the form of  lower taxes. It then becomes necessary to 
impute the income generated by the public capital stock, just as the 
income from owner occupied housing must be imputed. 
Finally, as we noted above, state and local governments rarely rely 
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citizens  will  act  as if  decisions were  made  by  a utility-maximizing 
representative voter. In a median voter model, this representative voter 
is the one who  prefers the  median level of local public goods; in  a 
Tiebout model, communities are homogeneous and therefore any voter 
can  be considered as the representative  voter.  The relevant  cost of 
local public goods in this maximization problem is its shadow price PX. 
Therefore local taxes in these models are equivalent to user fees and 
all of the points that we made above in  a world where governments 
set user charges equal to the unit cost of production continue to hold. 
7.2.4  Bond Financed Public Capital 
It is not difficult to show that in the context of our simple model the 
method  of  financing the  acquisition  of  public  sector capital  has no 
impact on the cost of using that capital. Suppose the community we 
have considered had issued PI  dollars of bonds when it bought a unit 
of capital. The interest on those bonds would be rP1  dollars. The value 
of housing in this community would rise by PI( 1 - 6) dollars as a result 
of the larger capital stock and fall by P‘  dollars because of  the debt 
which must be repaid. These three terms together represent the cost 
of using capital for one period; they equal P1(r + 6), as in the all-equity 
case. 
7.2.5  The Federal Government 
The federal government influences the cost of local public goods in 
at least two important ways. First, local taxes are deductible. There- 
fore, if the federal tax rate is t, then the marginal cost of  local public 
goods from  the  perspective  of  the  community  is  (1 - t)PK/FK  and 
(1 - t)PL/FL.  From society’s perspective, marginal cost is unchanged 
and therefore federal taxation introduces a wedge between the social 
cost of producing local public goods and their benefits. 
We  might then ask, how should we treat this implicit subsidy in our 
system of accounts if we wish to put the state and local sector and the 
private sector on the same footing? From the perspective of an income 
and product account, the inputs used in the state and local sector must 
be  valued at their market prices. This follows directly from the fact 
that these accounts are derived from Euler’s equation. The value of 
output received by a producer equals the cost of inputs purchased by 
that producer. Thus if a firm receives $100 in revenue, which is then 
paid to the owners of the labor and capital used to produce the firm’s 
output, the set of accounts should value that output at $100, even if a 
subsidy to the buyer reduces the net cost to $50.5 
The federal government also influences cost by  offering grants to 
state and local governments which offset part of the cost of acquiring 
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As Bradford and Oates (1971) argue, nonmatching grants are equiv- 
alent to an increase in income for the citizens of a community. An open- 
ended matching grant under which the federal government pays 9 per- 
cent of  the cost of all units of  capital effectively reduces the cost of 
acquiring capital to (1 - 8)P'.  Therefore a more general expression for 
the cost of public sector capital is 
(7)  PK = P'(l  - O)(r + 6). 
Matching grants thus play the same role in  the cost of  capital in the 
public sector as do investment tax credits in the private sector. 
The effects of  closed-ended matching capital grants depend on the 
level of  capital chosen by  the community. If a community purchases 
less capital than the maximum level the federal government will sub- 
sidize, then the program is functionally equivalent to an open-ended 
matching  grant;  in  this  case  the  price  of  public  sector  capital  is 
P'(1  - 9)(r  + 6).  If a community purchases more capital than the fed- 
eral government will subsidize, then the program is functionally equiv- 
alent to a nonmatching grant; the relevant price of capital is P'(r  + 6) 
and the community receives additional income equal to the subsidy on 
capital.  Finally, if  the community  chooses exactly the quantity the 
federal government will subsidize, we can show that it behaves as if it 
faces a shadow price of capital yP'(r  + 6),  where y lies between (1 - 9) 
and  1. 
7.3  The Production of  State and Local  Public Goods 
An important implication of the preceding analysis is that an income 
and product account can be constructed for the state and local gov- 
ernment sector even though there is no independent measure of sectoral 
output. In this section of the paper we develop estimates of state and 
local output and input for the period  1959 to 1985. We  then compare 
our results to those obtained directly from NIPA. 
We  begin by examining the technology used in the production of local 
public goods. The relationship between purchased inputs and output 
can change for two reasons. First, technical and managerial innovation 
may occur. Thus, for example, computers may allow communities to 
better regulate the flow of traffic, police to respond more quickly to 
emergencies, and teachers to improve their students' understanding of 
algebra. 
Second, the production of local public goods depends on purchased 
inputs as well as the characteristics of the citizens. Bradford, Malt, 
and Oates (1969)  drew the important distinction between  what they 
termed D-output and C-output. D-output is the direct output of a local 
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time to respond to a reported fire, and the number of  hours of  math- 
ematics instruction in  the  public  schools. The amount of  D-output 
produced  depends only on purchased inputs.  C-output is the public 
service output that enters citizens’ utility functions, and would include 
the level of public safety and the level of education achievement. The 
level of C-output depends on the amount of  D-output and the char- 
acteristics of the population. For example, with identical expenditures 
for education, children in white-collar or upper-income communities 
may show greater educational achievement than children in blue-collar 
or low-income communities. 
Both effects may alter the quantity of output obtained from a given 
amount of input. To allow for this possibility, we define A as an index 
of  total factor productivity and assume that A  enters the production 
function  as a Hicks neutral  change parameter.  We  also extend  our 
previous specification of technology by  including services S and non- 
durable intermediate goods G as well as labor L and capital K as inputs. 
The technology can then be written as 
(8)  X  = AF(K, L,  S,  G). 
We  continue to assume that the production function exhibits constant 
returns to scale and that communities hire each factor of  production 
up to the point that the value of  the marginal product of  that factor 
equals its price, and that output is priced at marginal cost, Px.  As noted 
above, this implies that the value of output must equal the value of the 
inputs required to produce that output: 
(9)  PxX = PKK + PLL + PsS  -k  PGG. 
In the construction of private sector accounts, an independent es- 
timate of  PxX is available. Data on the current account inputs PLL, 
PsS, and PGG are also available and capital stock K  can be estimated 
using the perpetual inventory method, equation (2), given estimates of 
investment spending. The user cost can therefore be estimated as the 
residual that causes equation (9) to hold. 
The situation is obviously different for the public sector. Independent 
estimates of  PxX are not  available,  but  PxX can  be  imputed  given 
estimates of the values on the right-hand side of (9). The values PLL, 
PsS, and PGG are available from NIPA, and K can be estimated using 
a perpetual inventory method. This implies that PxX can be imputed 
given an exogeneous value for the unobserved user cost PK.  This pro- 
cedure is thus the converse of the procedure for constructing the private 
sector account, and the “value”  of output constructed in this way is 
a cost-based measure. 
Equation (9) defines the value of the goods and services produced 
by  state and local governments in a manner which is consistent with 226  Charles R. Hulten and Roberf M. Schwab 
theory and the underlying technology. It differs from the total purchases 
of state and local governments E  which  is the measure of output in 
many studies, and which is defined as 
(10)  E = PiI + PLL f PsS  + PGG. 
The difference between these two concepts is (P‘I -  PKK);  purchases 
are not an adequate measure of output becaue they include the acqui- 
sition of capital and exclude the cost of using the services from the 
existing stock. 
The estimation of real output X also requires indirect methods. Total 
differentiation of the technology in equation (8) implies 
(11) 
where sK, sL,  sG, and ss represent output elasticities.  The marginal 
productivity conditions imply that these output elasticities equal each 
factor’s share of the community’s  cost of producing local public goods, 
e.g., sK = (PKKX)  / (PxX). 
If X were a private good, then we would have independent estimates 
of the growth rates of X,  K,  L,  S,  and G. In that case we could infer 
productivity growth (the growth rate of A)  as a residual. But X  cannot 
be observed directly; we can estimate PxX  but  we cannot separate 
price and quantity without additional information. 
We  are therefore forced to construct our accounts in a somewhat 
different way. We  impose an estimate of productivity growth (zero in 
the estimates presented below), and then infer the growth rate of output 
as the share-weighted growth rates of  inputs.6 While this is clearly an 
arbitrary assumption, it is consistent with the estimates in Hulten (1984) 
and elsewhere. We choose 1982 as our benchmark and then use these 
growth rates to estimate constant dollar aggregate output for the state 
and local sector for the 1959 to 1985 period. 
The estimation of X via (1 1) permits PxX to be separated into price 
and quantity components. Px  has the ready interpretation as the mar- 
ginal cost of producing X. We  therefore rely on the assumption that 
communities are cost minimizers in our estimation of the real output 
of the state and local sector. 
The assumptions underlying our estimates are clearly arguable.  It 
may not be appropriate to characterize the various functions of state 
and local governments by a single production function. Furthermore, 
public decision  makers may have objectives other than the efficient 
production  of goods and  services. The assumption of a zero rate of 
productivity growth is at best a compromise between competing points 
of view. 
The framework of  this paper is not, however,  without  merit.  As 
Solow (1957) argues, the production  theoretic framework should not 
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be viewed as true per se, but rather as a systematic and explicit frame- 
work for organizing data. In this context, it should be noted that this 
framework, however imperfect, has the virtue of defining the theoret- 
ically correct measure of public sector output. It is clearly superior to 
a framework which implicitly assumes that there is no public sector 
capital (or that  it has  no  value); police  officers ride  in  squad cars, 
children sit in  classrooms, and water flows through pipes. While our 
estimates of  PK and Kx  may be problematic, they must represent an 
improvement over current practice. 
Moreover, the total purchases approach to output measurement will 
almost never yield a valid measure. While total purchases may be the 
right concept for the analysis of cash flow and budget constraint prob- 
lems, it is hard to  justify its use in problems relating to the demand for 
and production of goods and services, except in the extreme circum- 
stance of steady state growth. 
In a more positive vein, our approach-embedded in the identity in 
(9)-has  the sensible property that it defines the value of gross output 
as the value of resources withdrawn from the production of other goods 
and services. While this value is not necessarily equal to the value to 
the  consumer of  the goods  produced,  it  does focus on  the  cost of 
producing those goods. 
7.3.1  Data 
The basic data source for our estimates is Part 3 of the U.S.  National 
Income and Product Accounts. NIPA provides data on various aspects 
of state and local economic activity, including the purchases of goods 
and services, transfer payments, and the activities of government en- 
terprises. Since the focus of the paper is the production of goods and 
services,  we  omit transfer  payments from  the  analysis and  include 
government enterprises with general government. 
Table 7.1 sets forth state and local current dollar expenditures on 
structures and equipment, employee compensation, and purchases of 
intermediate goods and services; table 7.2 presents the corresponding 
data in constant 1982 dollars. It is clear from table 7.2 that real gross 
investment fell sharply after 1968, and this decline has sparked a deep 
concern over the condition  of  the public infrastructure.’  Real  labor 
compensation continued to rise through the 1970s and then remained 
roughly constant until 1985. 
Table 7.3 expresses the expenditure data as shares.  It shows that 
relative expenditures on services and nondurables rose very rapidly 
over the period.  In  1959, these two categories together represented 
18.7 percent of total state and local expenditures; by  1984 this figure 
had  risen  to 28.8  percent.  Labor’s share remained  roughly constant 
during this time. In sharp contrast, the share of state and local expen- Table 7.1  Total Purchases State and Local Government Sector (billions of current dollars) 
Expenditure  Expenditure  Expenditure 
Years  Purchases  of  Employees  Goods  Services  Goods  Structures  Equipment 
























































































































































































































20.8 Table 7.2  Total Purchases State and Local Government Sector (billions of constant 1982 dollars) 
Expenditure  Expenditure  Expenditure 
Year  Purchases  of Employees  Goods  Services  Goods  Structures  Equipment 
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Table 7.3  Expenditure Shares 
Compensation 
of  Capital 
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ditures devoted to capital expenditures fell from 30.0 percent in 1959 
to 14.5 percent in 1985, a decline of more than one-half. 
As we argued above, the basic difference between the total purchases 
concept of expenditure summarized in tables 7.1 through 7.3 and the 
value of gross output lies in the treatment of capital. In particular, the 
theoretically correct measure of output requires us to replace invest- 
ment expenditures (column 6 in tables 7.1 and 7.2) with an estimate of 
the value of the current flow of capital services. 
The valuation of  capital services requires two steps: (1) the calcu- 
lation of constant dollar stocks of each of three types of capital assets, 
and (2) estimation of  the per unit  service price for each asset. The 
stocks of  depreciable assets, structures and equipment, can be esti- 
mated  through  the perpetual inventory method  in equation (2); the 
capital stock in the current year equals the capital stock in the previous 
year less depreciation plus investment during the previous year. The 
real investment series in equation (2), I,, for structures and equipment 231  Income Originating in the State and Local Sector 
are based on columns 6 and 7 of table 7.2 for the 1959-85  period and 
unpublished data from the Bureau of  Economic Analysis (BEA) for 
the earlier period. Sufficiently long time series are available so that the 
initial stocks can be ignored in the recursive application of  (2).8 
The estimation of the rate of depreciation, 6, is another matter, how- 
ever. No systematic data are available and therefore indirect methods 
are required. The study by Boskin, Robinson, and Huber (1986), based 
on the depreciation study of Hulten and Wykoff (1981), estimates de- 
preciation rates of  approximately  13.1 percent for equipment and  1.9 
percent for structures, and we have used those estimates in our work. 
These rates of depreciation are somewhat lower than the rates implied 
by the BEA assumptions on asset life and retirement distribution. 
BEA  provides  unpublished  estimates  of  current  dollar land  pur- 
chases. We  use a 1958 benchmark from Goldsmith (1962) and a price 
deflator for land based on the Bureau of  the Census index for land in 
the nonagricultural sector and Department of Agriculture estimates of 
the value of  rural land. 
Table 7.4 presents estimates of the stocks of structures, equipment, 
and land in current and constant dollars. The deflators for structures 
and equipment are obtained from NIPA, and refer to the replacement 
cost of  these  asset^.^ 
If all assets were rented in competitive markets, then the observed 
rental prices would serve as the appropriate rental prices  in the cal- 
culation of the value of local public goods as specified in equation (10) 
and the growth of output as specified in equation (1 1).  Unfortunately, 
this is not the case and we must therefore impute these rental prices. 
Equation (7) provides the basis for this imputation. The user cost of 
capital, as shown in (7), equals P'(1  - O)(r + 6), where 8  is the federal 
matching rate, r is the discount rate, 6 is the rate of economic depre- 
ciation, and P'  is the asset price of capital. The estimates of the rate 
of  depreciation and the asset price embedded in our user cost calcu- 
lations are the same as those we discussed above.  Estimates of the 
subsidy parameter are based on Schneiderman (1975) and U.S. General 
Accounting Office (1983).1° 
As noted above, the user.cost of capital is determined endogenously 
in growth analyses of  the private sector. Specifically, the private rate 
of  return in  (5) is allowed to adjust so as to equate the right- and left- 
hand sides of (9). This procedure yields an ex post estimate of the rate 
of  return which can be shown to provide an adjustment for capacity 
utilization (Berndt and Fuss 1986; Hulten 1986b). This approach is not 
available in the public sector and we require an exogenous value of  r 
in order to impute PK  on the right side of  (9). 
The choice of an appropriate discount rate is not clear. In equilibrium, 
arbitrage should insure that the rate of return on all capital in the same 
risk class is the same. But, recent work by Gordon and Slemrod (1983, Table 7.4  Price and Quantity of the Capital Stock (value in billions of current dollars) 
Structures  Equipment  Land 








































































































































24.0  8.0 
25.0  8.5 
26.4  9.4 
27.7  9.8 
29.2  10.2 
31.0  11.3 
33.2  12.2 
35.6  13.5 
38.3  14.9 
41 .0  16.4 
43.6  18.5 
46.3  20.3 
49.1  22.4 
51.8  24.4 
55.2  26.9 
59.4  32.3 
64.3  39.5 
68.5  44.6 
72.3  49.7 
75.9  56.2 
79.4  63.6 
83.0  72.6 
86.5  82.2 
89.2  89.2 
92.2  93.9 
96.3  100.6 
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1984) and Hulten (1986a) suggests that the arbitrage assumption may 
not be a good guide to the selection of an appropriate discount rate. 
Lacking a better alternative (or, at least, one that commands wide- 
spread acceptance), we select the long-term nominal interest rate on 
municipal bonds, less long-term expected inflation, as our rate of dis- 
count for public sector capital income. This assumption is attractive 
in that the municipal bond market is the major source of funds for the 
acquisition of public sector capital. 
We  thus require a measure of long-term expected inflation. There 
has been a great deal of research on the formation of short-term ex- 
pections, and a number of alternative approaches have been developed, 
including distributed lag models, rational expectations models, and the 
use of  survey data.  II Long-term expected inflation, however, has re- 
ceived less attention. We  have used the following procedure. Joseph 
Livingston, a Philadelphia journalist, began in  1946 to survey roughly 
50 economists for their forecasts of  inflation (as measured by the Con- 
sumer Price Index) for the coming 6 and 12 months. We  base our long- 
term estimate of inflation on these short-term forecasts, using the fol- 
lowing method. We  denote the 12-month Livingston forecasts made in 
period t by T;,  ,  .I2  We  assume that the Livingston respondents form 
their expectations by  looking at past actual inflation, T,-~,  according 
to the process 
(12) 
We  estimate the parameters  of  (12) and then generate forecasts for 
future periods T;+*,  T;,~,  etc. by replacing past actual inflation in (13) 
with forecasts for earlier years.  Long-term  expected inflation is the 
average forecast rate for the coming five years. 
Our estimates of long-term expected inflation are shown in the second 
column of  table  7.5.  Standard and  Poor’s nominal interest  rates on 
high-grade municipal bonds are shown in the third column. The last 
column represents our estimates of  the real interest rate in  the state 
and local sector. These estimates are consistent with the patterns noted 
by  Blanchard and Summers (1984) and others; real interest rates re- 
mained roughly constant through the 1960s, fell during the 1970s, and 
then rose sharply in the first half of  the 1980s. 
Inasmuch as the choice of  appropriate discount rate is problematic, 
we present alternative estimates (which parallel the calculations pre- 
sented in the text) in an appendix. These alternative calculations as- 
sume that the appropriate discount rate is the real ex post return in the 
private  sector.13 The estimates of gross product in the appendix can 
then be interpreted as the marginal opportunity cost of resources em- 
ployed to produce local public goods. 
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Table 7.5  Real and Nominal Interest Rates 
Expected  Nominal  Real 

















































































































7.3.2  Current Dollar Accounts 
The gross output account for the state and local sector is shown in 
table 7.6 and represents our implementation of equation (9). The last 
column is  the sum of  the implicit rentals on three  types of capital: 
structures, equipment, and land. The third, fourth, and fifth columns 
show employee compensation, expenditures on nondurable goods, and 
services. The second column is the sum of the last four, i.e., the value 
of output equals the sum of the factor payments given Euler’s theorem 
(under constant returns to scale). Table 7.7 presents the corresponding 
factor shares. 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7, which focus on gross output, present a rather 
different picture of the state and local sector than do tables 7.1 and 
7.3, which focus on expenditure. As shown in table 7.3, capital’s share 
of expenditures fell by nearly  16 percentage points from 1959 to 1985; 
in contrast, capital’s share of gross output was unchanged. 235  Income Originating in the State and Local Sector 
Table 7.6  Gross Output Account for the State and Local Sector 
(billions of current dollars) 
Labor 



































































































































































This pattern reflects  the rapid accumulation  of capital in the state 
and local sector during the 1950s and 1960s. This was a period when 
the baby boom generation began to reach school age and therefore the 
needs for additional educational  facilities  rose sharply.  Further, the 
ambitious interstate highway program was begun during this period, 
while  rapid  suburbanization  led  to additional  infrastructure require- 
ments. These factors led to an investment boom. After the boom ended, 
the consequent larger capital stock continued to generate the capital 
income imputed in this paper. Therefore capital’s share of output re- 
mained roughly constant while its share of expenditures fell sharply. 
High real rates in the 1980s also played an important role. 
These considerations have some important implications for measur- 
ing the growth of output over time. As shown in tables 7.1 and 7.6, 
current dollar gross output in  1959 was about 15 percent lower than 
expenditure; in  1985 it was 6 percent higher.  Our estimates therefore 236  Charles R. Hulten and Robert M. Schwab 
Table 7.7  Income Shares of Gross Output 

























































































































































































































imply that the production  of local public goods grew faster than the 
total purchases approach suggests. This result has important implica- 
tions for econometric work on state and local governments; those stud- 
ies which rely on expenditures as a measure of the output in this sector 
have systematically mismeasured their dependent variable. 
This pattern is more dramatic if  we focus on value added rather than 
gross output. Value added in the private sector is the sum of compen- 
sation of  employees and the value of capital services, i.e., the private 
sector analogues to the sum of the third and sixth columns in table 7.6. 
NIPA defines value added for the state and local sector as the sum of 
compensation of  employees and the adjusted current surplus of gov- 
ernment enterprises. 
Table 7.8 compares these two measures. Our 1985 estimate of value 
added for the state and local sector is 122 billion dollars greater than 
the corresponding NIPA value.  Figure 7.2 presents our estimates of 








I959  26.8  32.6 
I960  29.5  35.5 
1961  32. I  38.0 
I962  34.7  40.3 
1963  37.8  44. I 
I964  41.1  47.4 
I965  44.8  52.5 
I966  49.9  58.9 
I967  55.6  65.9 
1968  62.4  73.1 
I969  69.6  86.7 
1970  78.7  98.0 
1971  87.5  103.4 
I972  96.6  111.4 
I973  107.8  123.5 
I974  118.1  136.7 
1975  132.6  162.6 
1976  145.0  165.1 
1977  157.7  169.3 
I978  172.7  190.9 
1979  188.0  208.2 
1980  207.4  243.9 
1981  225.4  295.3 
1982  244.7  332.0 
I983  262.2  334.4 
I984  282.4  368. I 
I985  306.3  428.3 
period. It shows that in 1985 NIPA understated the output of this sector 
by nearly 40 percent. 
7.3.3  Constant Dollar Accounts 
The preceding sections developed a set of current dollar gross output 
accounts for the state and local sector. We  now turn to a corresponding 
set of constant dollar accounts. The key issue here is the separation 
of value into prices and quantities. 
We  outlined our approach to estimating the growth rate of  output 
earlier;  assuming  productivity  growth  is  zero,  it  equals  the  share- 
weighted growth rates of  the inputs.I4 The growth rates of labor, in- 
termediate goods, and intermediate services are based on the factor 
payments in table 7.5 and price indices from NIPA; the required share 
estimates are reported in table 7.7. 
For capital, we use  1982 as our benchmark and expand our bench- 










1959  1963  1967  1971  1975  1979  1983 
Fig. 7.2  Alternative measures of  value added, Hulten-SchwabiNIPA. 
is defined as the growth rates of structures, equipment, and land from 
table 4 weighted by each asset’s share of payments to capital. Thus in 
continuous time, the growth rate of capital would be given by 
(13)  dln K  = X vidln Ki 
where i refers to structures, land, and equipment and vi equals the ith 
factor’s share of total rentals PfKiICPFKi.  Output is also benchmarked 
to 1982. 
The prices and quantities of output and inputs are shown in table 
7.9. That table suggests that we divide 1959-85  into two subperiods. 
As shown in table 7.10,  from  1959 to 1975, the real gross output of 
state and local governments grew at an average rate of  5.3 percent per 
year.  In sharp contrast, output grew only 2.3 percent per year from 
1975 to 1985. This reflects the slower growth of real input used in this 
sector, which in turn is linked to the slowdown in the growth of gov- 
ernment in the 1970s (and possibly to the slowdown in growth through- 
out the economy during this period). 
7.4  Summary and Conclusions 
We  have developed in this paper an accounting framework for state 
and local governments which  is consistent with  representative voter 
models of this sector. We have shown that this framework is in principle Table 7.9  Constant Dollar Gross Output Account (quantities in billions of constant 1982 dollars) 
Output  Capital  Labor  Services  Nondurables 
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Table 7.10  Average Annual Growth Rates of Inputs and Output 
output  Capital  Labor  Services  Nondurables 
1959-1975  0.053  0.047  0.044  0.074  0.068 
1975-  1985  0.023  0.020  0.019  0.012  0.024 
1959- 1985  0.041  0.037  0.034  0.050  0.05 I 
the same as the accounting framework for other sectors of the economy. 
We  have also shown that the capital income in this sector appears as 
a reduction in taxes, to the extent that capital is not financed by debt. 
In addition, we have found that the nondebt value of the public capital 
stock should be capitalized in housing values, and that the analysis of 
housing values can yield the implicit rent on public capital.I5 
We  have not implemented  a complete accounting framework; this 
would  involve the construction of income, expenditure, and wealth 
accounts for the state and local  sector, and substantial  revisions  in 
other sectoral accounts (particularly housing). This is beyond the scope 
of this paper and we have, instead, limited our empirical work to con- 
structing an income and product account for the state and local sector. 
This has involved the measurement of capital stocks and the imputation 
of capital income to the sector. 
Our empirical results indicate that current national income account- 
ing procedures substantially underestimate the amount of  income orig- 
inating in the state and local sector. In recent years, the size of this 
understatement is  on the order of  $100 billion.  This  can hardly  be 
considered a negligible  amount. There is, correspondingly, an over- 
statement of income in the housing sector, but we have not estimated 
the size of this effect. 
This missing income has important policy implications. The debate 
over tax reform focused on the various ways that the federal govern- 
ment subsidizes the production of local public goods. The federal tax 
treatment of part of the income accruing to state and local capital was 
discussed (the income reflected in municipal bond interest) but, since 
less than half of state and local capital formation is financed by debt, 
a  large  portion of  the capital  income  originating  in  the sector was 
ignored. 
Our results also present a rather different picture of the sector than 
might be obtained, for example, from the well-known study by Baumol 
(1967) or from NIPA. We  find that labor productivity (output per unit 
of labor input) grew at an average annual  rate of 0.6 percent, even 
under our assumption that there was  zero total  factor productivity 
growth; by contrast, NIPA  procedures imply that labor productivity 
growth was virtually zero. 241  Income Originating in the State and Local Sector 
Moreoever, we find that the state and local sector is in fact relatively 
capital intensive. According to data from the Bureau of  Labor Statis- 
tics, the capital-output ratio in private business was approximately 3.1 
in 1982. For the state and local sector, we find that the ratio of  capital 
to gross output was 4.1 in that year; the ratio of capital to value added 
was 5.6. If  productivity growth in this sector has in fact been slow, it 
cannot be attributed to the fact that the production of local public goods 
is labor intensive. 
The assumptions underlying some of  our methods and some of  our 
conclusions are clearly arguable.  But our point is not that NIPA mis- 
states the size of the state and local sector by $75 billion, $100 billion, 
or $150 billion. Rather, our point is that capital income in the state and 
local sector is not zero, and that our estimates suggest that the mag- 
nitude of the measurement error for this sector is large. 
Appendix 
This appendix  presents an alternative set of accounts based on the 
assumption that the appropriate discount rate for the state and local 
sector is the real ex post return in  the private sector. The numbering 
of these tables parallels the text. Thus, for example, table 7.A.6 in this 
appendix (which presents estimates of current dollar gross output based 
on the alternative real rate) is the analogue to table 7.6 in the text. 
As can be seen, the estimates in the appendix and the estimates in 
the text of  the paper are very similar. For example, as shown in table 
7.A.8, 1985 value added in the state and local sector under our ex post 
real rate  series is $415.7 billion; under our ex ante real rate  series, 
value added is $428.3 billion. 242  Charles R. Hulten and Robert M. Schwab 
Table 7.A.6  Gross Output Account for the State and Local Sector (billions of 
current dollars) 
Labor 
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Table 7.A.7  Income Shares of Gross Output 
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Table 7.A.8 
NlPA  Hulten-Schwab 


















































































Note: The figures in this table are based upon an alternative real rate of interest. Table 7.A.9  Constant Dollar Gross Output Account (quantities in billions of constant 1982 dollars) 
Year  output  Capital  Labor 
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Notes 
1.  In  a discrete time  model, it is  important to specify the timing  of all 
transactions. We have adopted the following convention. At the beginning of 
period  t, firms  “inherit”  a stock of  capital K,  and contract with  labor L,. 
Production takes place during the period. At the end of the period, output is 
sold, workers are paid, and an investment I, is made. The perpetual inventory 
equation in (2) and the cost of capital discussed below are consistent with this 
convention. 
2. The Pf+T  in (3) refers to the user cost of a new asset T years in the future. 
The expression (I - S).PftT is thus equal to the user cost of a .r-year-old asset 
which has “shrunk”  to (I - Sp of its original “size”. 
3. We assume  that there is no inflation so that the distinction between nominal 
and real rates of return can be ignored, and that there are no  taxes or subsidies. 
Our assumption about inflation  implies that the investment good price does 
not change, and therefore that there is no capital gain term in (5). The implicit 
rental payment is assumed to occur at the end of the year. 
4. There are actually two types of T-accounts that can be constructed at the 
sectoral level; (i) gross output accounts that include the value of intermediate 
inputs, and (ii) value-added accounts which net out intermediate  inputs and 
which  therefore measure the sector’s contribution  to total GNP. The latter 
measures the income which  originates in  the sector (i.e.,  capital and labor 
income); the former measures the output which is produced and the allocation 
of the value of this output to the factors of production.  Except under certain 
restrictive assumptions, gross output is the appropriate concept in the econ- 
ometric estimation of production functions. 
5. To see this point in another  context, consider other federal programs which 
subsidize consumption directly (such as food stamps) or indirectly (such as 
the deduction for medical  expenses). The national accounts would  measure 
the output of the food and medical sectors as the sum of the payments to factors 
of production. 
6. As we argued above, dln A captures productivity growth as we normally 
think of it in the private sector as well as the effects of changes in community 
characteristics, so a zero rate does not necessarily imply a static technology. 
For example, a change in society which increases criminal activity could offset 
technical  improvements in  law  enforcement, leaving output (public  safety) 
unchanged. 
7. See for example, National Council on Public Works Improvement (1986) 
and Hulten and Peterson (1984). 
8. The investment series extends back to 1850 for structures and back to 
1902 for equipment. Since the capital stock estimates in  this paper begin in 
1958, the influence of the initial benchmark is very small. At a 1.9 percent rate 
of depreciation, only 12.4 percent of the 1850 structures benchmark survives 
in  1959. 
9. It should be noted that the estimates in  table 7.4 refer to stocks rather 
than to a flow of services. In the absence of data or procedures (e.g., Berndt 
and Fuss 1986) to correct for variations in the rate of utilization, we are forced 
to assume that the utilization  rate remains constant. This may be a highly 
dubious assumption for public sector capital, since much of this capital is in 
networks (e.g.,  roads, sewers, water distribution) and it  is frequently  cost 
effective to build capacity in advance of need. Conversely, it is hard to expand 
existing capacity as demand increases (roads in crowded urban areas), or to 247  Income Originating in the State and Local Sector 
reduce the capital stock as demand decreases. Returns to scale in the con- 
struction of infrastructure, and regional and demographic shifts, almost cer- 
tainly lead to variations in the utilization of the measured stock of capital. 
10. By law, virtually all capital grants are matching grants. It might be rea- 
sonable, however, to argue that in fact these grants have many of the char- 
acteristics  of  lump-sum  grants.  Under  this  view,  the federal government 
establishes an aggregate level of funding and invites communities to compete 
for these funds. Our formulation of the user cost implicitly assumes that the 
grants are in fact matching grants. 
11. See Huizinga and Mishkin (1986) for a review of the literature in  this 
field. 
12. See Carlson (1977) for a discussion of the Livingston survey. 
13. We thank Barbara Fraumeni for providing this series to us. 
14. Our calculations are based on the discrete approximation to equation (9) 
in which differences in logarithms weighted by the average share in two suc- 
cessive periods replace the share-weighted logarithmic differentials. Diewert 
(1976) shows that this approximation is exact if  the underlying technology is 
translog. 
15.  We  believe  that this last result  points  to a promising area for future 
research; hedonic studies of housing values may ultimately lead to direct es- 
timates of user cost of capital and thus obviate the need for the imputation 
methods developed in this paper.  But, even if  this proves to be impossible, 
future research should examine the imputation of rental income to the housing 
sector. Part of the income and wealth attributed to the housing sector properly 
belongs in the government sector, and this may suggest a revision of current 
national income accounting procedures. 
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Comment  Helen F.  Ladd 
By analogy to the production of  household goods, Hulten and Schwab 
argue carefully and persuasively that capital used in the state and local 
public sector yields an implicit rate of  return to local citizens and that 
the annual value of  capital services is a more appropriate measure of 
capital’s contribution to output than is expenditure on capital goods. 
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Why this paper is included in a volume of fiscal federalism is not clear. 
The authors make only limited reference to the relationships among 
levels of government or to intergovernmental aid issues. Nonetheless, 
the paper  is  a high-quality piece  of  work  that  makes an  important 
contribution to our understanding  of  the role of  capital in the state- 
local public sector. 
The National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) measure the size 
of the state-local sector in terms of expenditures on inputs. This means 
capital’s contribution to the sector is measured by purchases of capital 
goods. Hulten and Schwab’s goal, in contrast, is to measure size in 
terms of gross output. Hence, the appropriate way to account for capital 
is in terms of  the annual value of  services it generates. Starting with 
the equivalence between the value of  output and payments to inputs, 
the annual value of services is equivalent to the amount of capital in 
the state and local sector multiplied by the implicit return to capital, 
as measured by the user cost of capital. 
The strength of  this approach is that  it  makes accounting for the 
state-local public sector consistent with that for the private sector and 
allows analysts to consider supply-side aspects of the sector. The ap- 
proach  requires strong assumptions, however, including constant re- 
turns to scale, homogeneous capital, cost-minimizing behavior of state 
and  local governments,  and  no  adjustment costs.  Although the as- 
sumptions may be  strong and not fully realistic, the Hulten-Schwab 
approach represents a useful contribution to national income account- 
ing and a clear step in the right direction for measuring capital income 
originating in the state and local sector. 
Five conclusions emerge from the paper. The first is that in  recent 
years capital  income in  the  state and  local  sector has  substantially 
exceeded annual expenditure on capital goods, as reported in the Na- 
tional Income and Product Accounts. Large capital investments in the 
late  1960s continue to produce services and to yield  implicit returns 
despite the recent dramatic decline in investment by  state and local 
governments. For example, the authors estimate that the value of cap- 
ital services exceeded expenditures on capital goods by  45 percent in 
1985. This, in turn, means that the NIPA expenditure approach under- 
estimates the size of the state and local public sector by about 7 percent. 
The conclusion is reversed for earlier years when capital outlays were 
high  relative to the services from existing capital; capital outlays in 
1959, for example, exceeded the value of  capital services by over 70 
percent and total state and local expenditures exceeded gross output 
by  14 percent. 
Second, capital’s contribution to state and local output has not de- 
clined as much as indicated by  the  standard accounting framework. 
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output the value of  capital services was about the same in  the early 
1980s as in the early 1960s. This contrasts dramatically with the NIPA 
expenditure approach which shows that capital outlays declined as a 
percentage of total state and local spending from a peak of 28.2 percent 
in the early 1960s to a low of 13.7 percent in  1983. 
Third, contrary to accepted wisdom, the  state and local sector is 
relatively capital intensive. According to the authors’ estimates, the 
capital-output ratio in  the state-local sector is about 4 to 1 while that 
in the private  sector is about 3 to 1. This means that below-average 
productivity growth in the state-local sector should not be attributed 
to the sector’s labor intensity alone. 
Fourth, real output in the state local sector grew at about 5.3 percent 
per year in  the 1959-75  period and about 2.3 percent per year in  the 
1975-85 period. Based on the assumption of no change in overall factor 
productivity, these estimates simply reflect changes in the quantity of 
inputs. A subsidiary conclusion is that labor productivity-output per 
unit of  labor input-grew  at an average annual rate of 0.6 percent per 
year, a substantial increase over the zero growth of labor productivity 
implicit in the NIPA approach. 
A  final, more theoretical, implication of the authors’ analysis relates 
to the ownership of the capital used in  the state and local sector. A 
natural question is who earns the implicit rate of  return to state and 
local  capital.  The  authors argue that  one can  view  state and  local 
officials as reducing taxes rather than paying dividends and that these 
reduced taxes get capitalized into higher housing prices. This implies 
that part of the income and wealth attributed to the housing sector in 
the national income accounts really belongs in the government sector. 
Central to the approach are the authors’ assumptions that state and 
local governments minimize costs and that the marginal cost of public 
sector production equals its value to consumers. These assumptions 
of  efficient production are less reasonable for the public sector where 
goods and services are provided through the budgetary mechanism than 
they are for the private sector with its discipline of  private markets. 
The Tiebout mechanism provides one possible source of discipline on 
public sector production: public officials must minimize costs and pro- 
duce services in line with consumer preferences to keep taxpayer voters 
from moving to other jurisdictions.  At best, however, such a model 
applies to relatively homogeneous suburban jurisdictions within a met- 
ropolitan area. Its general applicability to other local governments and 
to state governments is questionable. 
The voting mechanism provides an alternative source of discipline. 
Unless elected officials provide services in  line with consumer pref- 
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out of office. But the voting mechanism is an indirect and imprecise 
method for translating taxpayer preferences into public services. 
These observations about decision making in the public sector imply 
that total payments to factors of production may not translate into the 
value to citizens of  the output produced. The authors recognize this, 
but counter with the argument that a theoretically consistent framework 
is preferable to an inconsistent one. Only in the special case of steady- 
state growth would purchases of capital goods be justified as a measure 
of capital income or services produced. Moreover, the authors argue 
that even if their output measure does not represent value to citizens, 
their approach makes sense as a cost-based measure of  output. That 
is, it represents the value of resources withdrawn from the production 
of other goods and services. 
Of more concern are the assumptions of homogeneous capital, con- 
stant returns to scale, and no adjustment costs. Hulten and Schwab 
calculate the annual value of  services from capital as the product of 
the capital stock and the marginal productivity of capital as measured 
by the user cost of capital services. Key components of the user cost 
of  capital are the discount rate and the matching rate for federal aid. 
Their assumptions imply that a fall in the discount rate or an increase 
in the matching rate (both of which decrease the user cost of capital) 
decreases the marginal productivity of all units of capital. The intuition 
here, given their assumptions, is that the fall in the user cost of capital 
induces more  investment  and that this additional investment lowers 
the productivity of all of the homogeneous units of capital. 
But state and local capital is not homogeneous, in large part because 
of  its spatial dimension. If  the state of North Carolina responds to a 
lower user cost by investing in more roads, for example, there is little 
reason  to believe that the value of  the marginal product of  roads in 
California would fall. This is because roads in California are not the 
same good as roads in Maryland. This criticism can be mitigated by 
assuming that all cities and states face the same user cost of  capital 
and that there are no costs of adjusting capital stocks. In this case, not 
only North Carolina, but also California and every other state would 
invest in more roads in  response to a fall in  the user cost of  capital. 
Provided production is characterized by constant returns to scale and 
that capital is homogeneous within each state, this then would lead to 
a lower value of  product on each and every  unit  of  capital (roads) 
throughout the country. 
Adjustment  costs should also be considered.  The long-lived char- 
acteristic of  capital goods makes it difficult to reduce capital stocks 
over a short period of time and the lumpiness of many capital invest- 
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even if  all states face the same reduction in  the user cost of  capital, 
some may respond by increasing investment in the current period and 
others may not. Hence, the current user charge of  capital will  not be 
a good measure of the marginal productivity of capital in those states 
that do not respond in the current period. This means that multiplying 
the existing aggregate capital stock by the current user cost of capital 
gives a misleading picture of  the value of capital services. Note that 
adjustment lags create a problem for the accounting of private sector 
activities as well. What makes them so relevant here is their interaction 
with the spatial dimension of  state and local infrastructure. 
Consider what this implies for the authors’ estimates of the value of 
capital services. If  the federal government decreases its share of the 
cost of waste treatment plants from 80 percent to 60 percent, the user 
cost of capital faced by local governments would increase by  100 per- 
cent (from 20 percent of the original costs to 40 percent). While it is 
reasonable to believe that local officials would refrain from investing 
in new plants unless the returns are substantially  higher than before 
the change in federal aid, high adjustment costs make it implausible 
that the higher return applies to all existing plants in the current period 
as is implicit in the authors’ calculations. 
The same argument holds for changes  in the discount rate.  If  the 
discount rate did not change much over time, the assumption of costless 
adjustment would  be  less  of  a concern.  But  the authors’ preferred 
method for estimating the discount rate implies large changes over time 
in  the discount rate and consequently large changes in  the value of 
capital services. Hulten and Schwab correctly point out that economic 
theory yields no clear choice of  a discount rate. Their preferred dis- 
count rate is the long-term nominal interest rate on municipal bonds 
minus carefully estimated  measures of  long-term expected inflation. 
The resulting series of real interest rates varies substantially over time. 
The rate was about 2.5 percent in the early  1960s, jumped up to over 
3.5 percent in  1969 and 1970, fell to under 0.3 percent in  1977, and rose 
to 5.7 percent in  1985 (based on their table 7.5). 
The effect of this variation  over time in  the discount rate is sub- 
stantial. In an earlier version of  the appendix to their paper, Hulten 
and Schwab reported estimates of capital income based on a constant 
discount rate of  2.83 percent (the average over the period) that could 
be compared to the tables in the text based on the varying discount 
rate. The comparison is striking. Based on the authors’ preferred es- 
timates, the value of  capital services as a share of  gross output was 
exactly the same in  1985 as in  1959 (although it fell substantially in the 
late 1970s when real interest rates were low). This suggests that con- 
cerns about declining capital in the state and local sector may be mis- 
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that the share decreased steadily over time from about 21 percent in 
1959 to 14 percent in  1985, which is more in line with the picture that 
emerges based on the more common measure, capital outlays. 
My purpose here is not to criticize the authors’ choice of a discount 
rate. Their preferred rate is sensible. Moreover, appendix tables show 
that  an alternative rate, the  real  return  in the private  sector, yields 
estimates of  capital income reasonably  similar to those in  the text. 
Instead, my purpose is to highlight the importance of costless adjust- 
ment in a world with nonhomogeneous  capital.  In such a world, the 
standard approach is to argue that a rise in  the interest rate affects 
existing capital by lowering its value. The productivity of that existing 
capital does not change, but the rate of return rises on all capital through 
the downward revaluation of the capital stock. This change in valuation 
is not part of Hulton and Schwab’s analysis. Their estimate of the stock 
of capital in the state and local public sector depends only on annual 
investment and the rate of economic depreciation. A rise in the interest 
rate affects the return on new investment. Only  if all  capital is ho- 
mogeneous and can be adjusted costlessly would the rise in the interest 
rate affect the value of services produced by existing capital. Because 
adjustment  lags are ignored in  this  paper, the authors overstate the 
value of capital services when real interest rates are rising and under- 
state them when real interest rates are falling. 
Finally, I turn to the authors’ assumptions about the rate of economic 
depreciation. The depreciation rate enters the calculations in two ways. 
First it is a key determinant of the size of the capital stock which the 
authors estimate based on the perpetual inventory method. The lower 
is the rate of depreciation, the larger is the capital stock at any point 
in  time for any pattern of  investment, and consequently the larger is 
the value of capital services, all else constant. Working in  the other 
direction  is its  impact  on  the  user  cost  of  capital.  A  lower  rate  of 
depreciation lowers the user cost of  capital and consequently lowers 
the estimated value of capital services. 
Hulten and Schwab use a rate of  13.1 percent for equipment and 1.9 
percent for structures, both of which are lower than depreciation rates 
used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. These rates, based on pre- 
vious work, represent careful estimates derived from observed behav- 
ior in the private sector. Weaker incentives to maintain property in the 
public  sector than in  the  private sector,  however,  may  mean  these 
depreciation rates are too low. State and local officials have a number 
of incentives to undermaintain capital projects. First, federal aid pro- 
grams for capital projects may bias officials toward new construction 
and away from maintaining the existing stock. Second, the short-run 
perspective of many elected public officials combined with the relative 
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undermaintenance. Clearly not all  components of  the public  capital 
stock are equally undermaintained.  Evidence suggests that those fi- 
nanced  by an earmarked revenue source or user charges tend  to be 
better maintained than those whose financing is subject to the political 
process. But this observation only reinforces the possibility that much 
of the capital in the state and local sector may be less well maintained 
than capital used in the private sector. 
If  the depreciation  rates used by Hulten and Schwab are too low, 
their estimates of the capital stock are too high, but their estimates of 
the user cost of capital are too low. How these net out is not clear, but 
deserves further investigation. 
In sum, Hulten and Schwab have provided a systematic and theo- 
retically consistent accounting framework for the state and local public 
sector.  The framework  requires  some  strong and  questionable as- 
sumptions, but the basic approach is solid and worthy of further re- 
search and refinement. 